



Communications
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Centre de la sécurité
des télécommunications

CANADIAN CENTRE FOR **CYBER SECURITY**

COMMON CRITERIA CERTIFICATION REPORT

**Belkin F1DN102MOD-BA-4, F1DN202MOD-BA-4, F1DN104MOD-BA-4,
F1DN204MOD-BA-4, F1DN108MOD-BA-4, F1DN208MOD-BA-4,
F1DN102MOD-HH-4, F1DN102MOD-PP-4, F1DN102MOD-DD-4,
F1DN202MOD-HH-4, F1DN202MOD-PP-4, F1DN202MOD-DD-4,
F1DN104MOD-HH-4, F1DN104MOD-PP-4, F1DN108MOD-PP-4,
F1DN104MOD-DD-4, F1DN204MOD-HH-4, F1DN204MOD-PP-4,
F1DN208MOD-PP-4, F1DN204MOD-DD-4, F1DN104MOD-XX-4,
F1DN204MOD-XX-4 Firmware Version 44404-E7E7 Peripheral
Sharing Devices**

11 July 2017

534-EWA

FOREWORD

This certification report is an UNCLASSIFIED publication, issued under the authority of the Chief, Communications Security Establishment (CSE).

The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been evaluated at an approved testing laboratory established under the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (a branch of CSE). This certification report, and its associated certificate, applies only to the identified version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Canadian Common Criteria Program, and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence adduced.

This report, and its associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product by Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, and no warranty for the IT product by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, is either expressed or implied.

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OVERVIEW

The Canadian Common Criteria Program provides a third-party evaluation service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT) security products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) under the oversight of the Certification Body, which is managed by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security.

A CCTL is a commercial facility that has been approved by the Certification Body to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such approval is accreditation to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025, the General Requirements for the Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories.

By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the Certification Body asserts that the product complies with the security requirements specified in the associated security target. A security target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the security target, in addition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, the evaluated security functionality, and the testing and analysis conducted by the CCTL.

The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target are posted to the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the International Common Criteria Program).



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Belkin F1DN102MOD-BA-4, F1DN202MOD-BA-4, F1DN104MOD-BA-4, F1DN204MOD-BA-4, F1DN108MOD-BA-4, F1DN208MOD-BA-4, F1DN102MOD-HH-4, F1DN102MOD-PP-4, F1DN102MOD-DD-4, F1DN202MOD-HH-4, F1DN202MOD-PP-4, F1DN202MOD-DD-4, F1DN104MOD-HH-4, F1DN104MOD-PP-4, F1DN108MOD-PP-4, F1DN104MOD-DD-4, F1DN204MOD-HH-4, F1DN204MOD-PP-4, F1DN208MOD-PP-4, F1DN204MOD-DD-4, F1DN104MOD-XX-4, F1DN204MOD-XX-4 Firmware Version 44404-E7E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices (hereafter referred to as the Target of Evaluation, or TOE), from **Belkin International, Inc.**, was the subject of this Common Criteria evaluation. A description of the TOE can be found in Section 1.2. The results of this evaluation demonstrate that the TOE meets the requirements of the conformance claim listed in Section 1.1 for the evaluated security functionality.

EWA-Canada is the CCTL that conducted the evaluation. This evaluation was completed on 11 July 2017 and was carried out in accordance with the rules of the Canadian Common Criteria Program.

The scope of the evaluation is defined by the Security Target, which identifies assumptions made during the evaluation, the intended environment for the TOE, and the security functional/assurance requirements. Consumers are advised to verify that their operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations, and recommendations in this Certification Report.

The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, as the Certification Body, declares that this evaluation meets all the conditions of the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product is listed on the Certified Products list (CPL) for the Canadian Common Criteria Program and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the International Common Criteria Program).



1 IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET OF EVALUATION

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is identified as follows:

Table 1: TOE Identification

TOE Name and Version	Belkin F1DN102MOD-BA-4, F1DN202MOD-BA-4, F1DN104MOD-BA-4, F1DN204MOD-BA-4, F1DN108MOD-BA-4, F1DN208MOD-BA-4, F1DN102MOD-HH-4, F1DN102MOD-PP-4, F1DN102MOD-DD-4, F1DN202MOD-HH-4, F1DN202MOD-PP-4, F1DN202MOD-DD-4, F1DN104MOD-HH-4, F1DN104MOD-PP-4, F1DN108MOD-PP-4, F1DN104MOD-DD-4, F1DN204MOD-HH-4, F1DN204MOD-PP-4, F1DN208MOD-PP-4, F1DN204MOD-DD-4, F1DN104MOD-XX-4, F1DN204MOD-XX-4 Firmware Version 44404-E7E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices
Developer	Belkin International, Inc.

1.1 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE

The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5.

The TOE claims the following conformance:

Exact conformance with the NIAP, PP-Configuration for Peripheral Sharing Device Version 4.0, Keyboard/Mouse Devices, and Video/Display Devices and:

- Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device, Version 4.0
- PP-Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0
- PP-Module for Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0


1.2 TOE DESCRIPTION

The Belkin Secure Peripheral Sharing Devices are part of the Modular Secure KVM Series product line. These KVMs are modular KVM switches that support keyboard, mouse and video switching only. The units natively support High-Definition Multimedia Interface (HDMI) for switching, but also support DisplayPort, Digital Visual Interface-D (DVI-D), Video Graphics Array (VGA) and Universal Serial Bus Type C (USB-Type C) with DisplayPort as an alternate function video protocols through the use of proprietary cables.

1.3 TOE ARCHITECTURE

A diagram of the TOE architecture is as follows:

Figure 1: TOE Architecture




2 SECURITY POLICY

The TOE implements and enforces policies pertaining to the following security functionality:

- User Data Protection
- Protection of the TSF
- TOE Access

Complete details of the security functional requirements (SFRs) can be found in the Security Target (ST) referenced in section 8.2.



3 ASSUMPTIONS AND CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE

Consumers of the TOE should consider assumptions about usage and environmental settings as requirements for the product's installation and its operating environment. This will ensure the proper and secure operation of the TOE.

3.1 USAGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS

The following assumptions are made regarding the use and deployment of the TOE:

- No TEMPEST: Computers and peripheral devices connected to the PSD are not TEMPEST approved.
- Physical: The environment provides physical security commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it processes and contains.
- No wireless devices: The environment includes no wireless peripheral devices.
- Trusted admin and configuration: PSD Administrators and users are trusted to follow and apply all guidance in a trusted manner. Personnel configuring the PSD and its operational environment follow the applicable security configuration guidance.
- User allowed access: All PSD users are allowed to interact with all connected computers. It is not the role of the PSD to prevent or otherwise control user access to connected computers. Computers or their connected network shall have the required means to authenticate the user and to control access to their various resources.
- No special analog capabilities: The computers connected to the TOE are not equipped with special analog data collection cards or peripherals such as analog to digital interface, high performance audio interface, digital signal processing function, or analog video capture function.

3.2 CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE

All security features of this product were evaluated.



4 EVALUATED CONFIGURATION

The evaluated configuration for the TOE comprises:

TOE Software/Firmware	Belkin F1DN102MOD-BA-4, F1DN202MOD-BA-4, F1DN104MOD-BA-4, F1DN204MOD-BA-4, F1DN108MOD-BA-4, F1DN208MOD-BA-4, F1DN102MOD-HH-4, F1DN102MOD-PP-4, F1DN102MOD-DD-4, F1DN202MOD-HH-4, F1DN202MOD-PP-4, F1DN202MOD-DD-4, F1DN104MOD-HH-4, F1DN104MOD-PP-4, F1DN108MOD-PP-4, F1DN104MOD-DD-4, F1DN204MOD-HH-4, F1DN204MOD-PP-4, F1DN208MOD-PP-4, F1DN204MOD-DD-4, F1DN104MOD-XX-4, F1DN204MOD-XX-4 Firmware Version 44404-E7E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices
Environmental Support	General purpose computers. General purpose USB mouse. Standard computer display (HDMI 2.0, or DisplayPort 1.1, 1.2 or 1.3). Belkin KVM Cables.

4.1 DOCUMENTATION

The following documents are provided to the consumer to assist in the configuration and installation of the TOE:

- a) Quick Installation Guide 2/4/8 Port SKVM USB Keyboard with Lighting, 8820-02953 Rev.B00
- b) Belkin Regulatory Information, 8820-02969 Rev. A00

Guidance may be downloaded from the Belkin website (www.belkin.com) in .pdf format from the indicated locations.

5 EVALUATION ANALYSIS ACTIVITIES

The evaluation analysis activities involved a structured evaluation of the TOE. Documentation and process dealing with Development, Guidance Documents, and Life-Cycle Support were evaluated.

5.1 DEVELOPMENT

The evaluators analyzed the documentation provided by the vendor; they determined that the design completely and accurately describes the TOE security functionality (TSF) interfaces and how the TSF implements the security functional requirements. The evaluators determined that the initialization process is secure, that the security functions are protected against tamper and bypass, and that security domains are maintained.

5.2 GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS

The evaluators examined the TOE preparative user guidance and operational user guidance and determined that it sufficiently and unambiguously describes how to securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration and how to use and administer the product. The evaluators examined and tested the preparative and operational guidance and determined that they are complete and sufficiently detailed to result in a secure configuration.

Section 4.1 provides details on the guidance documents.

5.3 LIFE-CYCLE SUPPORT

An analysis of the TOE configuration management system and associated documentation was performed. The evaluators found that the TOE configuration items were clearly marked.

The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described all the procedures required to maintain the integrity of the TOE during distribution to the consumer.



6 TESTING ACTIVITIES

Testing consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing independent functional tests, and performing penetration tests.

6.1 ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPER TESTS

The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining their test evidence, and reviewing their test results, as documented in the Evaluation Test Report (ETR). The correspondence between the tests identified in the developer's test documentation and the functional specification was complete.

6.2 CONDUCT OF TESTING

The TOE was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented, independent functional and penetration tests. The detailed testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are documented in a separate Test Results document.

6.3 INDEPENDENT FUNCTIONAL TESTING

During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional tests by examining design and guidance documentation.

All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability of the testing procedures and results. The following testing activities were performed:

- a. PP Assurance Activities: The evaluator performed the assurance activities listed in the claimed PP

6.3.1 FUNCTIONAL TEST RESULTS

The developer's tests and the independent functional tests yielded the expected results, providing assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its ST and functional specification.



6.4 INDEPENDENT PENETRATION TESTING

The penetration testing effort focused on 4 flaw hypotheses.

- Public Vulnerability based (Type 1)
- Technical community sources (Type 2)
- Evaluation team generated (Type 3)
- Tool Generated (Type 4)

The evaluators conducted an independent review of all evaluation evidence, public domain vulnerability databases and technical community sources (Type 1 & 2). Additionally, the evaluators used automated vulnerability scanning tools to discover potential network, platform, and application layer vulnerabilities (Type 4). Based upon this review, the evaluators formulated flaw hypotheses (Type 3), which they used in their penetration testing effort.

6.4.1 PENETRATION TEST RESULTS

Type 1 & 2 searches were conducted on **7/11/2021** and included the following search terms:

Belkin	Belkin KVM	Belkin Firmware 44404-E7E7
Belkin Peripheral Sharing	HighSecLabs	F1DN102MOD-BA-4
F1DN202MOD-BA-4	F1DN104MOD-BA-4	F1DN204MOD-BA-4
F1DN108MOD-BA-4	F1DN208MOD-BA-4	F1DN102MOD-HH-4
F1DN102MOD-PP-4	F1DN102MOD-DD-4	F1DN202MOD-HH-4
F1DN202MOD-PP-4	F1DN202MOD-DD-4	F1DN104MOD-HH-4
F1DN104MOD-PP-4	F1DN108MOD-PP-4	F1DN104MOD-DD-4
F1DN204MOD-HH-4	F1DN204MOD-PP-4	F1DN208MOD-PP-4
F1DN204MOD-DD-4	F1DN104MOD-XX-4	F1DN204MOD-XX-4

Vulnerability searches were conducted using the following sources:

Check National Vulnerability Database: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search	Check HSL and Belkin support: http://highseclabs.com/ http://belkin.com/us/
Check Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures: https://google.ca	Port, Protocol and Vulnerability Scans: Software: Nmap, Wireshark and Nessus

The independent penetration testing did not uncover any residual exploitable vulnerabilities in the intended operating environment.



7 RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION

The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been evaluated at an approved testing laboratory established under the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS). This certification report, and its associated certificate, apply only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration.

This evaluation has provided the basis for the conformance claim documented in Table 1. The overall verdict for this evaluation is **PASS**. These results are supported by evidence in the ETR.

7.1 RECOMMENDATIONS/COMMENTS

It is recommended that all guidance outlined in Section 4.1 be followed to configure the TOE in the evaluated configuration.



8 SUPPORTING CONTENT

8.1 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Term	Definition
CAVP	Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CCTL	Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
CM	Configuration Management
CMVP	Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSE	Communications Security Establishment
CCCS	Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR	Evaluation Technical Report
GC	Government of Canada
IT	Information Technology
ITS	Information Technology Security
KVM	Keyboard, Video, Mouse
PP	Protection Profile
PSD	Peripheral Sharing Device
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Function

8.2 REFERENCES

Reference
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
Belkin F1DN102MOD-BA-4, F1DN202MOD- BA-4, F1DN104MOD-BA-4, F1DN204MOD- BA-4, F1DN108MOD- BA-4, F1DN208MOD- BA-4, F1DN102MOD-HH-4, F1DN102MOD-PP-4, F1DN102MOD-DD-4, F1DN202MOD-HH-4, F1DN202MOD-PP-4, F1DN202MOD-DD-4, F1DN104MOD-HH-4, F1DN104MOD-PP-4, F1DN108MOD-PP-4, F1DN104MOD-DD-4, F1DN204MOD-HH-4, F1DN204MOD-PP-4, F1DN208MOD-PP-4, F1DN204MOD-DD-4, F1DN104MOD-XX-4, F1DN204MOD-XX-4 Firmware Version 44404-E7E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices Security Target, Version 1.6, 8 July 2021
Evaluation Technical Report for Common Criteria evaluation of Belkin F1DN102MOD-BA-4, F1DN202MOD-BA-4, F1DN104MOD-BA-4, F1DN204MOD-BA-4, F1DN108MOD-BA-4, F1DN208MOD-BA-4, F1DN102MOD-HH-4, F1DN102MOD-PP-4, F1DN102MOD-DD-4, F1DN202MOD-HH-4, F1DN202MOD-PP-4, F1DN202MOD-DD-4, F1DN104MOD-HH-4, F1DN104MOD-PP-4, F1DN108MOD-PP-4, F1DN104MOD-DD-4, F1DN204MOD-HH-4, F1DN204MOD-PP-4, F1DN208MOD-PP-4, F1DN204MOD-DD-4, F1DN104MOD-XX-4, F1DN204MOD-XX-4 Firmware Version 44404-E7E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices, Version 1.1, 11 July 2021
Assurance Activity Report Belkin F1DN102MOD-BA-4, F1DN202MOD-BA-4, F1DN104MOD-BA-4, F1DN204MOD-BA-4, F1DN108MOD-BA-4, F1DN208MOD-BA-4, F1DN102MOD-HH-4, F1DN102MOD-PP-4, F1DN102MOD-DD-4, F1DN202MOD-HH-4, F1DN202MOD-PP-4, F1DN202MOD-DD-4, F1DN104MOD-HH-4, F1DN104MOD-PP-4, F1DN108MOD-PP-4, F1DN104MOD-DD-4, F1DN204MOD-HH-4, F1DN204MOD-PP-4, F1DN208MOD-PP-4, F1DN204MOD-DD-4, F1DN104MOD-XX-4, F1DN204MOD-XX-4 Firmware Version 44404-E7E7 Peripheral Sharing Device, Version 1.2, 23 July 2021